This is a book grounded in the real ethical challenges of modern business practice, with a world-religious perspective so necessary in an era of globalization.

The function and method of philosophy.--The nature of religious experience.--Religion and philosophy: naturalism.--Religion and philosophical idealism.--The structure of the universe and the objectivity of values.--The christian conception of god.--The doctrine of the person of christ.--The doctrine of the trinity.

I defend a naturalist theory of moral justification, "Confirmation Theory", from an objection raised by David Copp and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. Confirmation Theory holds that some moral theory is justified because it is needed in the best empirical explanation of the world. The objection is that moral explanations are "incidental", that even if a moral theory is indispensable, this doesn't establish that any moral standard is justified. I show that the naturalist can concede that moral explanations are incidental and still maintain (...) the attractive elements of Confirmation Theory. (shrink)

The observation that humans are often irrational has become commonplace. This observation has received empirical support from various experiments performed by cognitive scientists that are supposed to show that humans systematically violate principles of probability, rules of logic, and other norms of reasoning. In response to these experiments, philosophers have made creative and appealing arguments that these experiments must be mistaken or misinterpreted because humans must be rational. I examine these arguments for human rationality and show that they fail; cognitive (...) science does play a role in assessing human rationality. ;In Chapter One, I examine three cognitive science experiments in detail and discuss what is at issue in the debate about human rationality. At issue is whether the mistakes humans make are mere mistakes or indicative of systematic divergences from norms of reasoning. Defenders of human rationality say these mistakes are not characteristic of underlying reasoning abilities but are performance errors. Because humans make performance errors, human reasoning ability cannot be read off of behavior, but rather is to be studied by exploring cognitive competence, the underlying ability to reason. ;In Chapter Two, I develop and discuss the notion of cognitive competence. I then consider and reject two arguments that human cognitive competence must match the norms of reasoning. The first argument appeals to simplicity considerations, the second to the supposed common origin of our cognitive competence and our normative standards. In Chapter Three, I turn to a related argument for a view that humans are rational that says cognitive competence is discovered in the same way norms of reasoning are justified: both projects involve reflective equilibrium using as data people's judgments about what counts as good reasoning. ;In Chapter Four, I consider an argument for human rationality that draws on the principle of charity: when translating utterances of a speaker, one should try to interpret her utterances as rational and true. ;In Chapter Five, I consider an argument for human rationality that appeals to evolution. This argument claims that natural selection will select for cognitive mechanisms that produce true beliefs, and that such "truth-tropic" mechanisms are sufficient for being rational. ;My overall conclusion is that while cognitive science does not determine what the normative principles of reasoning are, it is relevant to whether or not human cognitive competence matches these principles; whether or not humans are irrational is, thus, an empirical question. (shrink)

Biologists have long theorized about the evolution of life cycles, meiosis, and sexual reproduction. We revisit these topics and propose that the fundamental difference between life cycles is where and when multicellularity is expressed. We develop a scenario to explain the evolutionary transition from the life cycle of a unicellular organism to one in which multicellularity is expressed in either the haploid or diploid phase, or both. We propose further that meiosis might have evolved as a mechanism to correct for (...) spontaneous whole‐genome duplication (auto‐polyploidy) and thus before the evolution of sexual reproduction sensu stricto (i.e. the formation of a diploid zygote via the fusion of haploid gametes) in the major eukaryotic clades. In addition, we propose, as others have, that sexual reproduction, which predominates in all eukaryotic clades, has many different advantages among which is that it produces variability among offspring and thus reduces sibling competition. (shrink)

As we go to press, the threat of biological or chemical warfare in the Persian Gulf is no longer imminent. Yet the questions raised by the proposed use of “investigational drugs,” without informed consent, to protect U.S. troops remain. The article by Edmund G. Howe and Edward D. Martin presents the arguments that informed the Pentagon's thinking on the subject. It and the commentaries, by George J. Annas and Michael A. Grodin, and Robert J. Levine, explore, among others, issues (...) of informed consent, of distinguishing ‘research’ and ‘treatment,’ and of the nature and extent of the autonomy of military personnel.—B‐JC, HLN. (shrink)